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BOOK REVIEW
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE AND PROHIBITIONS AGAINST
INSIDER TRADING: WHY A PROPERTY RIGHTS
THEORY OF INSIDE INFORMATION IS UNTENABLE
Roberta S. Karmel*
INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY IN THE USA AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Bernhard Bergmans, London: Graham & Trotman
(1991). 222 pp.
INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY, Jonathan
R. Macey, Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press (1991). 76 pp.
INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN, Emmanuel Gaillard Ed., Denver: Kluwer (1992).
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INTRODUCTION
Virtually every country that has an active and mature
stock market either has adopted or has under consideration a
law prohibiting trading on inside information. Professor
Gaillard's book, Insider Trading: The Laws Of Europe, The
' Professor and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International
Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. BA, Radcliffe, 1959; LL.B., New York
University, 1962. Professor Karmel is also a partner of Kelley Drye & Warren and
was a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-80.
The research assistance of Brooklyn Law School student Steven G. Sanders is
gratefully acknowledged.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
United States and Japan,' is an excellent compilation of the
laws on this subject in Europe, the United States and Japan.
These laws are roughly similar in substance, which is not
surprising in view of the aggressive leadership exercised by the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
and the influence of the Directive on Insider Dealing adopted
by the Council of the European Communities ("EC") on Novem-
ber 13, 1989.2 Such a convergence of law and interpretation
probably is salutary in view of the opportunities for the extra-
territorial application of law provided by insider trading cas-
es.3
Yet, despite the popularity of laws prohibiting insider
trading, there is little discussion or agreement by regulators or
commentators as to the philosophical objectives or precise
parameters of such prohibitions. The SEC generally argues
that insider trading is unfair and destructive of investor confi-
dence.4 In contrast, the law and economics school argues that
insider trading prohibitions create market inefficiencies and
should be eliminated.5 In Inside Information and Securities
Trading: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Liability in the
USA and European Community,6 Mr. Bergmans sets forth the
various arguments and theories of the regulators and
deregulators and finds them both wanting. He therefore posits
a new approach that would treat inside information as intellec-
tual property and protect it as such. Professor Macey, in Insid-
er Trading: Economics, Politics and Policy,' makes a similar
' INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN,
(Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 1992) [hereinafter Gaillard].
2 Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
See Gaillard, supra note 1, at 57, 75, 100, 123, 130, 144-45, 155, 167, 203,
247, 250, 268, 281, 340-41; see also Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a Globaliz-
ing Market: Who Should Regulate What? LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., August 1992,
at 263.
4 See generally In re Cady Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40
S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Schoenhanm v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
5 See BERNHARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING--A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY IN THE USA AND EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY 106, 118-19 (1991); JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS,
POLITICS AND POLICY 45-47 (1991).
See generally BERGMANS, supra note 5.
See generally MACEY, supra note 5.
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argument. The similarity of views of Mr. Bergmans, a Europe-
an bank lawyer, and Professor Macey, a professor at a United
States law school is interesting.8 Both authors are sympathetic
to the law and economics deregulators. Confronted by the reali-
ty of worldwide bans on insider trading, however, they feel
constrained to set forth a minimalist rationalization of these
prohibitions that focuses on protecting the property rights of
those who develop or obtain inside information.
The difficulty with an approach that views insider trading
from a property rights perspective is that it ignores the theo-
ries and policies of the primary proponent of insider trading
restrictions-the SEC. Admittedly, the law on insider trading
is, at the edges, unclear and confusing because the SEC's views
concerning insider trading have not been wholly accepted by
the United States Supreme Court. Yet, the Court has neither
wholly rejected these views nor has it articulated any alterna-
tive theories that explain all of the cases. The SEC, therefore,
has continued to prosecute insider trading cases to the extent
possible and has persuaded the United States Congress, for-
eign legislatures and foreign securities regulators to cooperate
in its campaign to stamp out insider trading as unfair and
inequitable.
A further problem with treating inside information as a
form of intellectual property entitled to legal protection is that
such a theory fails to integrate insider trading regulation into
the overall scheme of securities regulation. The prohibitions
against trading on inside information complement the manda-
tory disclosure provisions of the securities laws. If insider trad-
ing were generally permitted, the mandatory disclosure system
would be fatally undermined. One senses that such destruction
is the hidden agenda of some of the deregulators whose views
are generally both political and nihilistic.9
' Some of the differences between the two authors also are interesting. Al-
though Mr. Bergmans received a Master of Laws in the United States, he is a
European lawyer. His civil law background makes him unsympathetic to a com-
mon law approach to the development of legal principles. Professor Macey is en-
amored with economic models and formulas. This leads both authors to a search
for certainty that misses the political interplay between the SEC and the courts
that best explains the development of insider trading law.
' For example, Professor Macey states: "the SEC, then, has it exactly back-
ward when it argues that investors will not invest if they think the market is
rigged. In fact, investors will not invest if they think the market is not rigged."
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As Part I of this Book Review will explain, the SEC initial-
ly proposed a "parity-of-information" theory as the underpin-
ning for a general ban against insider trading. Although such a
theory would have assured that all material corporate informa-
tion was disseminated into the securities markets through the
SEC's mandatory disclosure system-and only through that
system-the principle that all buyers and sellers of securities
should have access to the same information was overly broad.
It would have generated unacceptable civil liability and out-
lawed legitimate business practices regarding the protection of
confidential information. Further, an all encompassing defini-
tion of inside information would have impaired market efficien-
cy and liquidity. Nevertheless, exceptions to the prohibitions
against trading on inside information should not be mistaken
for or distorted into the norm. Part II of this Book Review
criticizes the property rights theory and concludes that insider
trading prohibitions should not be viewed as isolated wrongs,
but as necessities that make the mandatory continuous disclo-
sure system work.
I. SOURCES OF U.S. LAW ON INSIDER TRADING
The prohibitions against trading on inside information
under the United States federal securities laws derive from
four sources: section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act")" and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereun-
der;" section 16 of the Exchange Act;' section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act" and Rule 14e-3 promulgated thereunder;'4
and the 1984 and 1988 statutory amendments to the Exchange
MACEY, supra note 5, at 43; see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT.
REV. 309, 314-39; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. REV. 523, 578-79 (1970) (both providing law and economics-based argu-
ments against insider trading prohibitions). But see James A. Boyle, A Theory of
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 1415, 1416 n.1 (1992) ("[Tlhe law and economics literature is beset by
a number of conceptual 'baseline' and Hohfeldian errors ...
10 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
,1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993).
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Act, which increased the sanctions for insider trading viola-
tions. 5 The most important of these sources for insider trad-
ing jurisprudence is Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful for
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of a securi-
ty
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a materi-
al fact necessary in order to make the statements made... not
misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any per-
son .... 16
Rule 10b-5 makes no reference to insiders, but prohibits cer-
tain fraudulent conduct by any person upon any other per-
son.
17
The typical insider trading case involves silence by a buyer
or seller of securities. The buyer or seller's complete failure to
disclose that it is in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion generally is not viewed as a violation of subsection (2) of
Rule 10b-5, which relates only to the making of untrue or mis-
leading statements. 8 Such inaction, however, can be inter-
preted as "a device, scheme or artifice to defraud" or as an "act,
practice or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or
deceit" 9 upon a third person. And while Rule 10b-5 generally
prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices in the public secu-
" The Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (codified as amended at various subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)); and
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at various subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78
& 80b-4a (1988)).
l' 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
17 Id.
18 Under an extreme version of the fraud-on-the-market theory, which is a
corollary of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH"), silence could be
considered misleading. The ECMH posits that a corporation's share price will accu-
rately reflect all publicly disclosed material information. See Christopher P. Saari,
Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and the Regu-
lation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). When the market
is deprived of material information, however, the fraud-on-the-market theory posits
that the corporation's share price will inaccurately reflect its true value. Simply
put, the market will be misled. Nevertheless, no liability under Rule lob-5 will be
imposed for silence absent a duty of disclosure. See infra notes 106-09 and accom-
panying text.
"' See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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rities markets, it does not extend so far as to outlaw all
breaches of fiduciary duty or overreaching."
Some insider trading cases do not involve "insider" trading
at all but, rather, trading by professionals on nonpublic market
information. The term "inside information" generally connotes
nonpublic information about events or circumstances related to
a company's assets or earning power, which is known only to
corporate management and its confidants, and which can rea-
sonably be expected to affect materially the company's share
price.2' By contrast, "market information" is information
about events or circumstances that affects the market for a
company's securities but which does not affect the company's
assets or earning power.22 Market information may be re-
ferred to as "outside information" because it relates to activi-
ties generated by investors, traders, market makers, brokerage
firms or others. Information concerning a tender offer is mar-
ket information and Rule 14e-32 generally prohibits anyone
but a bidder obtaining information about a not yet announced
tender offer from trading on that information.
A. Insider Trading as a Fraud Under Rule 10b-5
The first insider trading case under Rule 10b-5, In re Cady
Roberts & Co.,24 was an, SEC administrative proceeding in
which the director of an issuer, who was also a principal of a
brokerage firm, used undisclosed, adverse information-a divi-
dend reduction-to recommend and effect the sale of securities
" See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (parent company offering
grossly inadequate price to minority shareholders in freeze-out merger does not
violate Rule 10b-5 so long as it made truthful and accurate statements in required
SEC disclosure statements).
21 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane)
(upholding Rule 10b-5 liability for insiders who had traded upon and tipped infor-
mation about the corporation's newly discovered, yet undisclosed, mineral reserve),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
' Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Dis-
close Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799 (1973).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993).
24 Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). An earlier
section 21(a) report predated Rule 10b-5. In re Ward La France Truck Corp., Ex-
change Act release No. 3445, 13 S.E.C. 373 (May 20, 1943) (failure of corporate
insiders to disclose sharp increase in earnings and intention to liquidate company
when trading in their own shares violates securities laws).
[Vol. 59:149
BOOK REVIEW
for customers of the broker. In finding that these actions vio-
lated Rule 10b-5, the SEC stressed the existence of a relation-
ship that afforded the director access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and the
unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of
that information by trading without disclosure.'
The first major court case affirming the use of Rule 10b-5
as the basis for prohibiting trading on inside information was
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.26 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
SEC obtained an injunction against an issuer, its officers and
employees, forbidding them from trading and tipping others to
trade stock and options on the basis of material, undisclosed
information about a potentially major copper strike by the
issuer in Canada. Texas Gulf Sulphur was predicated on the
theory that Rule 10b-5 is based on the justifiable expectation
in the securities marketplace that investors who trade on im-
personal exchanges should have relatively equal access to ma-
terial information. It reversed the common law rule that an ac-
tion by a stockholder against a seller of securities cannot be
predicated upon mere silence even if the seller is a director of
the issuer whose securities are sold.27
In Texas Gulf Sulphur and in subsequent decisions the
SEC broadly argued that the antifraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act require a parity of information among all traders in
the public securities markets. Accordingly, an insider or his
tippee that comes into possession of confidential, nonpublic
information either should disclose that information or refrain
from trading on it.' As pointed out by Mr. Bergnans,29
though, there are two problems with this argument. First, it
appears to encourage non-disclosure rather than to mandate it.
Second, the Supreme Court has rejected the parity-of-infor-
' Cady Roberts, at 911-13.
26 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (no fraud liability for defen-
dant-corporate officer who bought shares in his corporation without disclosing to
seller that land owned by corporation may have valuable ore deposits). But see
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933) (defendant-director under a duty to
disclose information materially affecting value of stock before purchasing it from
shareholders).
' This view was adopted in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
See BERGMANS, supra note 5, at 54-57.
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mation theory articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur and its con-
tinuing doctrinal validity is therefore questionable. °
The Court rejected the parity-of-information theory be-
cause it quickly became apparent that a theory mandating that
a seller of securities either disclose any material information
about the securities known to the seller but not generally
known to the marketplace or abstain from trading was much
too broad. Instead, security analysts and other market profes-
sionals whose job was to ferret out information about securities
should be given the opportunity to trade on such information
as a matter of policy because such permitted trading would
foster better disclosure about securities and lead to more accu-
rate stock valuations. Furthermore, in situations involving
market information rather than inside corporate information, a
blanket prohibition against trading on information not general-
ly known would impede market liquidity. Accordingly, the law
on inside information developed to balance a policy favoring
fairness to investors generally against legitimate business
needs to keep information confidential or to permit profession-
als to trade on information that they have not obtained
through improper or surreptitious means.
Differences in opinion at the SEC as to a theoretical basis
for insider trading bans narrower than the one articulated in
Cady Roberts arose in In re Investors Management Co.3 The
SEC brought this administrative proceeding against invest-
ment advisers and mutual fund managers who sold stock in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. because of selective disclosure of a
reduction in Douglas' earnings to institutional investors by
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith." The Commission
held that one who obtains material, nonpublic corporate infor-
mation which he has reason to know emanates from a corpo-
rate source and which by itself places him in a position superi-
" See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980); see also Dirks v.
United States, 463 U.S. 637 (1982). But see, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
234 (1988) ("Disclosure, and not the paternalistic withholding of accurate informa-
tion, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress.").
31 Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 S.E.C. 633 (July 29, 1971).
32 Merrill Lynch had learned of this information in its role as underwriter of
McDonnell Douglas debentures. In a separate proceeding Merrill Lynch consented
to a sanction and established a Chinese Wall between its investment banking and
brokerage departments to prevent such misuse of inside information. In re Merrill
Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 8459, 43 S.E.C. 933 (Nov. 25, 1968).
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or to other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with
respect to that information, giving rise to a legal duty within
the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions." In a
concurring opinion, Commissioner Smith asserted that tippee
responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility
such that the tippee knew the information was given to him in
breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to
the issuer not to disclose the information. Further, the infor-
mation must be shown not only to be material and nonpublic,
but also to have substantially contributed to the trading that
occurred.'
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court limited the
scope of insider trading violations in Chiarella v. United
States.3" Chiarella involved a printer who learned about up-
coming tender offers for several target companies, purchased
shares in the companies prior to the offer and then sold his
shares at a premium after the offer had been announced. The
Court held that silence in connection with a purchase or sale
constitutes fraud only if liability is premised on a duty to dis-
close arising from a relationship of trust and confidence, and
not merely upon one's ability to utilize information because of
his position in the marketplace.36 Thus, unlike the relation-
ship of trust and confidence between a corporate insider and a
shareholder recognized in Cady Roberts,7 Chiarella simply
availed himself of information learned during his employment,
and was therefore under no affirmative duty of disclosure."
Although the defendant's conduct may have been reprehensi-
ble, the Supreme Court pointed out that not every instance of
financial unfairness necessarily violates Rule 10b-5.
Then, in Dirks v. SEC39 the Supreme Court clarified its
views as set forth in Chiarella by essentially adopting the
rationale of Commissioner Smith's concurring opinion in Inves-
tors Management." Dirks, a securities analyst and an officer
Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 640-41.
Id. at 649-51.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Id. at 230.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
' Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-33.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
4' See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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of a broker-dealer firm, received information from a former
officer of Equity Funding Corporation of America to the effect
that the business of Equity Funding was permeated with fraud
and that its assets were grossly overstated. In the course of a
futile effort by Dirks to publicize this information generally,
institutions informed by Dirks about these facts sold their
Equity Funding stock, causing its price to drop from twenty-six
dollars to fifteen dollars per share. Dirks did not have a client
or fiduciary relationship with Equity Funding. Nevertheless,
the SEC sanctioned him, holding that "where tippees-regard-
less of their motivation or occupation-come into possession of
material corporate information that they know is confidential
and know or should know came from a corporate insider, they
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading."
41
The Supreme Court reversed the Commission, holding that
an affirmative duty of disclosure arises from the relationship
between parties and not merely from a person's ability to uti-
lize information because of his position in the market.42 The
Court stated in dictum that under certain circumstances, such
as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant working for the
corporation, outsiders may become fiduciaries of the stockhold-
ers.43 However, the Court stressed that the basis for recogniz-
ing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons have
acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
had entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and were given access to
information solely for corporate purposes.'
B. Short Swing Profit Prohibitions
Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Investors Management
and Dirks were all cases that involved classic leaks of undis-
41 In re Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket (CCH) 1401,
1407 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
42 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15 ("Mere possession of non-public information does
not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship does
that.").
43 Id. at 662-63.
44 Id. at 657-58.
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closed material information emanating from a corporate
source. As explained in the collection of articles in Professor
Gaillard's book, this type of activity is banned in every country
that has an insider trading law.45 In the United States, this
ban is reinforced by the provisions of section 16 of the Ex-
change Act,4" which requires officers, directors and holders of
ten percent or more of any Exchange Act reporting issuer's
stock to report all of their purchase and sale transactions in
the equity securities of that issuer and to disgorge to the issuer
any profits realized as a result of purchase and sale transac-
tions effected within a six-month period. The purpose of section
16 is to prevent the unfair use of information that may have
been obtained by insiders in the purchase and sale or sale and
purchase of securities. The prohibition is designed to eliminate
transactions for profit by officers, directors and shareholders in
the stocks of their own companies with the benefit of advance
information.47 Section 16 is a crude rule of thumb. An
insider's liability for short swing profits does not depend on
actual use of inside information.48
Section 16 is a remarkably effective prophylactic tool for
preventing trading on inside information by officers, directors
and shareholders. There have been many insider trading cases
over the years since Texas Gulf Sulphur, but few have involved
direct trading by corporate officials. Most other countries do
not have a law comparable to section 16." Countries lacking
such a law may find it difficult to police or curtail insider trad-
ing, particularly if the only enforcement mechanism for such
trading violations is criminal prosecution. While there has
been debate in the United States as to whether there is a con-
tinuing need for the section 16 reporting and short swing profit
prohibitions in view of heightened SEC and civil enforcement
' See Gaillard, supra note 1, at 10, 223, 240, 249, 263, 276, 334.
15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
4 See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
48 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943); see also Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947).
4' An exception is Japan, which does have a short swing trading rule modeled
after U.S. law. See Gaillard, supra note 1, at 328; see also Elyse Diamond, Note,
Outside Investors, A New Breed of Insider Traders?, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. s319,
s325-31 (1992) (reviewing insider trading laws of Europe and Japan and noting
that only Japan has short swing profit prohibition).
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of insider trading violations and other shareholder reporting
requirements,50 there are strong policy arguments against
repealing section 16."'
The principle that corporate insiders should not profit
from trading on material, undisclosed information has been
challenged by only a few law and economics extremists.52 The
interpretive problems involve trading by remote tippees, espe-
cially when there is no business or professional relationship
between an insider and the tippee.53 Such a situation arose in
United States v. Chestman, where the defendant had tipped
a stockbroker who traded on the information. The husband had
learned the information from his wife, who learned it from her
mother, who learned it from her brother, a corporate insider.
The court could find no fiduciary relationship in this chain of
tippers that would make the husband culpable under Rule 10b-
5. Kinship did not suffice and the husband-defendant did not
explicitly assume a duty of confidentiality concerning the infor-
mation he received. A strongly worded dissent criticized the
majority as drawing an unrealistic line leading to a perverse
and circular result.5
The doctrinal difficulties presented by Chestman derive
See, e.g., section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
5' First, section 16 removes "the temptation for corporate executives to profit
from short-term price fluctuations at the expense of the long-term financial health
of their companies." Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing-Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAw. 1087, 1092 (1987). Second, it
penalizes the unfair use of inside information and "softer" information to which
shareholders are not privy. Id. Finally, section 16 prevents corporate insiders from
influencing corporate events in order to maximize their short-term trading profits.
Id. Thus, section 16 continues to play an integral role in the struggle to curtail
insider trading. Professor Salbo argues, by contrast, that short-swing profit prohibi-
tions such as section 16 would be unnecessary if a clear definition of insider trad-
ing were implemented. Steven R. Salbo, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global
Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 861 (1992)
('Clear and precise regulation of insider trading would eliminate the need for sec-
tion 16(b).").
' This idea was first raised in HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regu-
lation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983) (arguing against insider
trading prohibitions and citing authorities for same).
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States
v. Newman, 664 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 63 (1983).
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
Id. at 583-88 (Mahoney J., dissenting).
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from Chiarella's and Dirks' requirement that a fiduciary rela-
tionship exist to sustain an obligation either to disclose materi-
al nonpublic information or to refrain from trading. The lower
federal courts and the SEC seized upon Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Chiarella56 to develop the misappropriation theory
under which anyone who misappropriates material nonpublic
information in breach of an employment, fiduciary or similar
duty to anyone and then trades on or tips that information to
his own advantage violates Rule 10b-5.57 This stress on pro-
tecting an employer's right to keep information confidential
has prompted Mr. Bergmans and Professor Macey to theorize
that there is a property right inherent in inside information.
However, these theories are anomalous because they stress the
rights of insiders rather than the protection of investors. The
SEC has found the misappropriation theory a convenient tool
for antifraud enforcement. In the final analysis, however, it is
faulty because it has the potential for turning employee work
rules into criminal statutes" and for extending Rule 10b-5's
coverage to those outside the securities markets.59 In short,
the misappropriation theory may be "merely a pretext for en-
forcing equal opportunity in information."" Yet, the SEC has
495 U.S. 222, 239-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57 See United States v. Teicher, 614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 910 (1980); see also SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985)..
" Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogerty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIo
ST. L.J. 353, 365 n.54 (1988) ("'This is particularly striking in a newspaper case
[where] . . . liberal recognition of property rights in confidential information might
subject reporters who rely on 'leaks' to prosecution for fraud by misappropria-
tion.").
"' As one author has noted:
An examination of... Carpenter indicates that some members of the
Court may have agreed with the Petitioners that the Second Circuit
erred in construing rule 10b-5 to protect persons other than buyers and
sellers of securities. Even if they accepted the results in Newman and
Materia, some Justices may have balked at interpreting the misappropria-
tion theory to encompass the misuse of information belonging to a 'mar-
ket observer' rather than to a 'market participant.'
Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and its Aftermath,
49 01O ST. L.J. 373, 376 (1988) (footnotes omitted); see also United States v.
Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986) (Miner, J., dissenting), affd, 484
U.S. 19 (1987).
6 Cox & Fogerty, supra note 58, at 366 (footnote omitted). Without a doubt,
one of the greatest shortfalls of Carpenter-and perhaps of the entire misappro-
priation theory-is that while "Winans committed a felony in trading on his
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not developed an alternative to the parity of information theo-
ry on the one hand and the fiduciary duty-misappropriation
theory on the other hand.
C. Insider Trading in Advance of Tender Offers
The fiduciary duty-misappropriation theory is incapable of
providing broad investor protection in situations involving
market information, especially with regard to advance informa-
tion concerning tender offers. After the Chiarella decision the
SEC adopted Rule 14e-3"' to deal with the misuse of informa-
tion regarding prospective tender offers. That rule sets forth a
disclose-or-abstain prohibition upon any person other than a
bidder or prospective bidder who is in possession of material
information relating to a tender offer "which information he
knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows
or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from: (1) the offering person, (2) [the target], or (3) any officer,
director, partner or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person .... .62
The SEC justified Rule 14e-3, arguing that trading by
persons in possession of material nonpublic information relat-
ing to a tender offer results in unfair disparities in market
information and causes market disruptions because
securityholders who purchase from or sell to such persons are
effectively denied protection of the mandatory disclosure provi-
sions of the Williams Act. If furnished with information about
the tender offer, however, they could make an informed invest-
ment decision.63 This is essentially the parity-of-information
theory in the context of a tender offer. In addition, Rule 14e-3
clearly was intended to enforce the disclosure provisions of the
Exchange Act relating to tender offers.
The Second Circuit addressed a persistent question con-
cerning the validity of Rule 14e-3 in the above-described case
publisher's confidential information, the publisher might have traded with impuni-
ty." Id.
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993).
62 Id.
' Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980). The author was a Commissioner of
the SEC when this rule was initially proposed.
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of United States v. Chestman.6' In the first opinion issued by
the Second Circuit, a majority found that a Rule 14e-3 criminal
conviction was invalid, but the two majority judges set forth
different reasons for their finding. On one hand, Judge
Carman found Rule 14e-3 to be a valid exercise of the SEC's
authority, but only because he read the rule as requiring proof
of scienter and a breach of a fiduciary relationship. He never-
theless voted to reverse Chestman's conviction because the
district court failed to instruct the jury as to those elements."5
Judge Mahoney, on the other hand, took the position that Rule
14e-3 was beyond the SEC's authority because it does not re-
quire that any fiduciary duty exist or be violated.6 He inter-
preted the "deceptive acts or practices" language of section
14(e),67 under which Rule 14e-3 was promulgated, as limiting
the SEC's rulemaking authority to prohibiting traditional com-
mon law fraud, which requires that a duty exist and be
breached as a precondition to liability. This radical view that
the SEC's rulemaking authority is constrained by the common
law was squarely rejected by a subsequent en banc decision
(with one dissent)." Judge Meskill, writing for the majori-
ty,69 upheld the defendant's conviction and the SEC's authori-
ty to promulgate Rule 14e-3 on two grounds. First, the statuto-
ry power to define and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent fraudulent acts and practices allows the SEC to define
fraud in ways that go beyond the common law.7" Second, the
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
65 903 F.2d 75, 86 (2d Cir. 1990) (Carman, J., concurring in result).
Id. at 84 (Mahoney, J., concurring in result).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988). Simply put, Judge Mahoney believed that section
14(e) should be interpreted in the same manner as the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the relationship between section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 125 (1976) (because section 10(b) specifical-
ly deals with deceptive or deceitful (fraudulent) conduct, scienter must necessarily
be an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation). See also Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,
472 U.S. 1 (1985) (deceptive conduct is a precondition to section 14(e) violation).
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
0' In fact, the en bane decision to affirm the Rule 14e-3 conviction does not
command a "majority;" although ten judges agreed that the conviction should
stand, they split five apiece as to the correct reasoning.
70 Id. at 558. Indeed, while section 14(e) contains an additional grant of au-
thority similar to the one contained in section 10(b), unlike section 10(b), however,
section 14(e) allows the Commission to define and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative conduct. 15. U.S.C. §
BOOK REVIEW1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
power to prevent fraud in the tender offer context necessarily
encompasses the power to proscribe conduct outside the pur-
view of common law or SEC-defined fraud.7'
Professor Macey criticizes Rule 14e-3 because it is based
on a fairness rather than a property rights perspective and
"inexplicably" protects the rights of shareholders of target
firms as against bidders.72 However, this criticism ignores
Congress' fundamental purpose in passing the Williams Act,
under which Rule 14e-3 was enacted, which was to provide
shareholders with sufficient information to evaluate a tender
offer and to reduce the pressure on such shareholders when
making their investment decisions.73 Similarly, Mr. Bergmans
regards Rule 14e-3 as an exception to his rights-in-information
theory.74 Under his approach a prospective tender offeror
would be free to do anything he wished with the information
that he was planning to make a tender offer, including tip oth-
ers.75 The trouble with the Macey-Bergmans property rights
theory is that it ignores the Wall Street scandals of the 1980s
and the many successful criminal prosecutions of, among oth-
ers Dennis Levine, Martin Siegel, Ivan Boesky and Michael
Milken concerning trading on advance information about ten-
der offers.76
D. Recent Statutory Developments
"Although Professor Macey and Mr. Bergmans may believe
that inside information is property to which insiders have
rights they should be permitted to utilize, Congress, in the face
of the insider trading cases of the 1980s, determined otherwise.
In 1984 and again in 1988 Congress amended the Exchange
Act to increase the sanctions for insider trading and to make
SEC enforcement of the prohibitions against insider trading
more effective. Before describing the 1984 and 1988 statutes,
78n(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
71 947 F.2d at 558.
72 MACEY, supra note 5, at 49.
7' J. Robert Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws,
53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 741, 746 n.12 (1985).
74 BERGMANS, supra note 5, at 201.
75 Id. at 200-01.
76 See generally JAMEs B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
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however, some background on damage claims under Rule 10b-5
is necessary.
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 7 a case growing out of the
widespread insider trading in McDonnell Douglas stock that
led to SEC administrative proceedings described above, 8 the
Second Circuit implied a private right of action against traders
and tippees in favor of any investors who purchased securities
in the open market during the period of the illegal sales and
prior to public disclosure of the adverse news. This principle
had enormous civil liability potential and could have resulted
in possible unfairness in the context of a suit against an issu-
er, by shifting losses from one group of shareholders who had
purchased or sold before material information was released to
those shareholders at the time a litigation is concluded. More-
over, litigation costs in this type of situation are an added
burden on the issuer. Although in a world of perfect informa-
tional efficiency stock prices should reflect such liabilities,
stock market activity takes place in the real world, not in a
theoretical economic model.
The courts, therefore, backed away from the implications
of Shapiro. In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.9 the Second
Circuit announced a disgorgement measure of damages in
insider trading cases. In explaining why an out-of-pocket mea-
sure should be rejected, the court pointed to the "potential for
imposition of Draconian, exorbitant damages, out of all propor-
tion to the wrong committed, lining the pockets of all interim
investors and their counsel at the expense of innocent share-
holders.""0 In addition to reducing the measure of damages,
the court subsequently cut back the number of plaintiffs who
could sue in insider trading cases. After Chiarella and Dirks,
the Second Circuit, in Moss v. Morgan Stanley,"' declined to
imply a private right of action in favor of a selling shareholder
of a target corporation where an investment banker and his
tippees had purchased the target's shares after learning about
the takeover bid. The investment banker's employer represent-
77 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
' See supra notes 31-54 and accompanying text.
79 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 170.
" 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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ed the bidder. The court held that there was no duty owed by
the bidder's investment banker to the target or its sharehold-
ers. Ironically, under the misappropriation theory, the court
sustained a criminal conviction against the insider traders.82
The Elkind and Moss cases were criticized for failing to
provide a meaningful monetary sanction against insider trad-
ers; courts simultaneously were sending people to jail for con-
duct for which they were not being penalized in financial
terms." In the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
("ITSA"), Congress therefore gave the SEC the authority to
seek up to three times the profits made or losses avoided as a
civil penalty against insider traders. This penalty was intended
to be imposed over and above any other remedies directed at
the wrongdoer.85
The insider trading scandals of the 1980s were publicly
exposed after the enactment of the ITSA. Therefore, the law
unfortunately was perceived as ineffective. In an atmosphere of
impending elections, Congress, in October 1988, passed the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
("ITSFEA')."6 This law created a private right of action on
behalf of contemporaneous traders (overriding Moss v. Morgan
Stanley)," inserted a new bounty provision into the statute
for persons who provide information on insider trading viola-
tions," increased criminal fines to one million dollars for indi-
viduals and 2.5 million dollars for non-natural persons89 and
' United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), on remand, 534 F.
Supp. 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983); United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981).
' Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitu-
tion Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349, 396-97 (1984).
' The Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264(1984) (codified as amended at various subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)) and
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at various subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 &
80b-4a (1988)).
' See Donald B. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and
its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1280-81 (1984).
' See Larry R. Lavoie, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988, 22 REv. SEC. & COMM1. REG. 1 (Jan. 11, 1989).
Section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988).
Section 21A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (1988).
89 Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78if(a) (1988).
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gave the SEC greater authority to investigate international
securities law violations.9" In addition, broker-dealers and
investment advisers were required to establish Chinese walls
and other procedures designed to prevent the misuse of mate-
rial nonpublic information.9'
In 1987 a serious legislative attempt was made to codify a
definition of insider trading. A committee of securities lawyers
suggested a definition that was then introduced as part of the
Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987:92 "information shall
have been used or obtained wrongfully only if it has been ob-
tained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly,
theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fiducia-
ry, contractual, employment, personal or other relationship of
trust and confidence."93
The SEC objected to this definition and introduced its own
bill to revise the definition of insider trading.94 After hearings,
a revised bill, different from the initial Senate bill or the SEC's
initial proposal was introduced that would have prohibited
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information
only if such information
has been obtained by, or its communication would constitute, direct-
ly or indirectly, (A) theft, bribery misrepresentation, espionage
(through electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropria-
tion, or any other breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any personal
or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any con-
tractual or employment relationship."
The substitution of a "possession" for a "use" standard
proved so controversial that no action was taken on the insider
trading issue until the next session of Congress when the
ITSFEA was passed.96 The ITSFEA contained no statutory
so Section 2(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(1) (1988).
9' Section 15(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1988) and section 204A
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-4a (1988).
"2 S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Id. § 2.
SEC Proposed Insider Trading Bill § 2, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1284
(Aug. 7, 1987).
" SEC Proposed Insider Trading Bill § 2, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817,
(Nov. 18, 1987).
66 See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, United States v. Chestman-Trading Secu-
rities on the Basis of Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer, 57
BRooK L. REv. 595, 616 (1991).
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definition of insider trading because such a definition poten-
tially could lead to narrower judicial construction. 7 However,
the legislative history endorsed both a broad fiduciary duty
standard and the misappropriation theory. 8
I. CRITIQUE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY
The view that inside information is a property right that
insiders should be permitted to exploit is morally obnoxious
and legally unsound. Simply put, it is an attempt to transform
the dark side of capitalism into a public good but it wholly
ignores the public interest and public opinion.' The "greed is
good" creed of Ivan Boesky... should have been discredited by
academics long ago. However, the law and economics defense
of nefarious Wall Street traders has had a peculiarly persistent
appeal and has even been embraced by some members of the
judiciary. 10 '
On the other hand, the SEC's arguments for prohibiting
insider trading often have been pushed too far. Also, during
the 1980s the SEC seemed to be concentrating exclusively on
insider trading cases and ignoring more important matters
such as market manipulation. Further, the government's crimi-
9' H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.CA.N. 6043, 6048.
" "Individuals have a duty not to 'misappropriate' information from their em-
ployers or otherwise in breach of a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and
confidence, and commit securities fraud when they trade in possession of misappro-
priated information or tip others who trade." Id. at 10.
" See Homer Kripke, Manne's Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945 (1985).
100 True to form, Ivan Boesky stated at a University of California Business
School graduation that "Greed is all right, by the way. I want you to know that. I
think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself." The
response was applause and laughter. DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL
STREET'S INSIDER TRADING SCANDAL 145 (1987).
101 Macey repeatedly cites Judge Easterbrook to bolster his arguments. A typical
example follows:
Perhaps the most familiar policy justification for banning insider trading
is that such trading is unfair. Justice Blackman, for example, has argued
that insider trading is 'inherently unfair' and that the Supreme Court
should interpret the securities laws 'flexibly' to increase the fairness of
the securities markets. Justice Blackman's approach was obliterated in a
stinging commentary by Judge Easterbrook.
MACEY, supra note 5, at 23 (footnote omitted).
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nal prosecution of marginal tippers and tippees has led to a
number of defeats, starting with Chiarella, that have under-
mined the legal and policy foundations for insider trading
prohibitions.
What the law on insider trading could use is a balanced
perspective. First, there needs to be a greater appreciation for
the relationship between the mandatory continuous disclosure
system (including affirmative disclosure obligations during
tender offers) and insider trading restrictions. Second, there
needs to be some principled basis for drawing a line between
insiders, culpable tippers and tippees and other stock market
traders. Most importantly, these should not be unrelated en-
deavors.
The Exchange Act requires public companies to make
continuing disclosure of material information. In addition to
regular annual and quarterly reporting requirements, certain
material events must be reported in a timely fashion. 2 Fur-
thermore, any group that agrees to purchase, sell or hold pub-
licly traded securities if the holdings of such a group aggregate
five percent of the issuer's stock must file a timely disclosure
schedule with the SEC.' Any person making a tender offer
must similarly file a timely disclosure schedule with the
SEC. ' 4 The Exchange Act regulations are complemented by
rules of the national securities exchanges that impose on listed
companies a duty to release quickly to the public any news or
information that might be expected to affect materially the
market for its securities.'0 5
"2 Annual reports must be filed within 90 days of the end of an issuer's fiscal
year, Rules 13a-1 and 15d-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, .15d-1 (1993), and proxies
sent in connection with the annual meeting of shareholders must be accompanied
or preceded by an annual report. Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 14a-3(b) (1993). Quarter-
ly reports must be filed within 45 days after the end of an issuer's first 3 quar-
ters. Rules 13a-13 and 15d-13, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, .15d-13 (1993). When cer-
tain enumerated material developments occur, a report on Form 8-K must be filed
within 15 days after the material event. Rules 13a-11 and 15d-11, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13a-11, .15d-11 (1993).
" Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988), Rule 13d-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1993), and Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-100 (1993), pro-
mulgated thereunder.
"o4 Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988), Rule 14d-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1993), and Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1993),
promulgated thereunder.
"n New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 202.05, 3 Fed. Sec. L.
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Nevertheless, public companies have no general duty to
disclose material corporate developments or other material
inside information." 6 In Basic v. Levinson,107 a case involv-
ing preliminary merger negotiations, the Supreme Court clari-
fied the test for materiality of information under Rule 10b-5,
reaffirmed an issuer's liability for materially misleading disclo-
sure and adopted a presumption of reliance for causation pur-
poses premised upon the fraud-on-the-market theory.0 8 Also,
by way of dictum, the Court stated that "[slilence, absent a
duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5." °9
The principle that public companies may keep silent about
material events conflicts with the underlying policies of full
and continuous disclosure embodied in the securities laws.
However, premature disclosure of business negotiations or
competitively sensitive matters could harm a company and its
existing shareholders. Therefore, the SEC and the courts have
balanced investors' needs for disclosure against management's
legitimate need for secrecy."' This same solicitude for confi-
dentiality in order to protect legitimate business purposes has
been accorded to bidders in tender offers until the tender offer
is commenced.
Nevertheless, the prohibitions against insider trading are
necessary in order to ensure that confidentiality is not abused
and utilized for the personal and secret profit of corporate
Rep. (CCH) 23,520; American Stock Exchange Company Guide § 401, 3 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. Guide (CCH) 23,124A; National Association of Securities Dealers
Inc. Manual, Schedule D, NASD Manual (CCH) 1802-72.
106 Brown, supra note 73, at 750.
'0 485 U.S. 223 (1988).
108 See supra note, 18.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17.
11 See Brown, supra note 73, at 752. For an excellent example of the SEC's
attempt to balance investors' needs for disclosure against a corporation's legitimate
need for confidentiality, see the instruction to Schedule 14D-9, Item 7, which re-
quires a company that is the target of a tender offer to disclose that it is negoti-
ating with a third party for a recapitalization or merger:
If no agreement in principle has yet been reached, the possible terms of
any transactions or the parties thereto need not be disclosed if in the
opinion of the Board of Directors of the subject company such disclosure
would jeopardize continuation of such negotiations. In such event, disclo-
sure that negotiations are being undertaken or are underway and are in
the preliminary stages will be sufficient.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (Item 7) (1993).
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managers and employees or persons associated with a bidder
in a tender offer. For silence not to be misleading, it must
mean silence, and not selective disclosure. This does not imply
that issuers, bidders or insiders have a property right in the
information not disclosed. That information must be made
publicly available to investors as soon as its dissemination will
no longer do more harm than good to shareholders-as soon as
it becomes ripe for disclosure."' Generally, this occurs when
an issuer or bidder begins to take the action to which the infor-
mation relates.
The prohibition against tipping and the use of inside infor-
mation by tippees for personal profit is necessary to prevent
those persons from circumventing the basic prohibitions
against insider trading. However, the foregoing principles are
limited by exceptions for security analysts who assist in the
disclosure process by ferreting out information or other market
professionals who contribute liquidity to the trading markets.
At the time that the ITSFEA was under consideration by Con-
gress, the Legal Advisory Committee of the New York Stock
Exchange ("Committee") prepared a Report proposing a statu-
tory definition of insider trading."2 The Committee recog-
nized and agreed that the insider trading doctrine is founded
on the need to preserve investor confidence in the market.
"That confidence is undermined when investors come to regard
the market as a 'rigged' game because corporate insiders and
others who are entrusted with valuable nonpublic information
use that information for their own trading purposes.""' How-
ever, the Committee also noted that there is an important
interest to be served in preserving the ability of investors to
ferret out information by honest means.
In view of these policies, the Committee agreed that a
statutory definition of insider trading should ensure that no
one be permitted to trade in the securities markets on the
. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). The line drawn between this case
and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), is instructive.
112 LEGAL ADVISORY COMm., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PROPOSED STATUTORY
DEFINITION OF INSIDER TRADING (June 30, 1987). At the time this report was
prepared and published the author was a director of the New York Stock Ex-
change and was an ex officio member of the Legal Advisory Committee.
- Id. at 5.
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basis of material nonpublic information that either has been
entrusted to him or her for legitimate trading purposes or that
he or she knows has been obtained by theft, misappropriation
or other improper means. However, such a definition "should
not chill a vigorous search for information by securities ana-
lysts, shareholders and investors who probe corporate manag-
ers with questions that go behind the disclosures in financial
and other reports." 4 Instead of being limited by the misap-
propriation theory, the Committee focused on prohibiting trad-
ing on information that either was wrongfully obtained or
wrongfully used in four situations: information obtained by
theft or conversions; use of information in breach of a fiduciary
duty; use of information in violation of a personal or other
relationship of trust or confidence; and, use of information in
violation of a contractual or employment duty."'
An earlier effort to distinguish between the legitimate and
illegitimate use of informational advantages in the securities
markets was more encompassing because it addressed market
as well as inside corporate information. In an article written
before the Supreme Court decided Chiarella, Professor Victor
Brudney suggested that the rule against trading on inside
information should forbid exploiting unerodable informational
advantages that one trader has over another, such as is advan-
tages in having information that a public investor could not
lawfully acquire." 6 In Professor Brudney's view, the purpose
of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws was to pre-
vent overreaching of public investors; efficiency was a more
peripheral goal."7 In addition, disclosure was intended to
serve a regulatory function and to mitigate temptations by in-
siders to manipulate security prices through delayed, inaccu-
rate or misleading reports. 1 8
Professor Brudney's theory extended to outside informa-
" Id. at 4-5.
15 Id. at 14-18.
1 Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 359, 376 (1979). Professor
Brudney's article might have been more influential if the Supreme Court had
relied on his theories in Chiarella and Dirks. See supra notes 35-44 and accom-
panying text.
17 Id. at 334.
1 Id. at 335.
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tion as well as inside corporate information. He noted that
stock exchange specialists enjoy unerodable informational
advantages but their trading is heavily regulated to prevent
misuse of these advantages."9 The insider trading for which
Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken and their cohorts were notorious
should properly be viewed as the misuse of informational ad-
vantages by members of a pool-like operation who had the
informational advantages of monopolists, but unlike exchange
specialists, were not regulated to prevent manipulative activi-
ty." While specialists, market makers and other traders who
add liquidity to the public securities markets may be entitled
to an exception from insider trading prohibitions similar to the
one enjoyed by securities analysts, regulation of their activities
is nevertheless appropriate. In addition, their tippees, who
serve no similar function of providing liquidity to the markets,
should not be excused from insider trading prohibitions.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has on occasion tried to place
a common law limitation on Rule 10b-5, at other times it has
interpreted the antifraud provisions more expansively. The
securities markets clearly are dynamic and the law should be
equally responsive to changing conditions. The fiduciary duty
theories of Chiarella and Dirks, even as amplified by the mis-
appropriation theory, are simply inadequate to cover the fact
patterns of cases in which some have been enjoined by the
SEC or have even gone to prison. Further, despite the criti-
cisms of insider trading prosecutions as unjust because insider
trading remains statutorily undefined,"2 people who hide
their activities in secret foreign accounts and run around with
suitcases full of cash know they are engaging in illegal con-
duct.'22 A re-examination of policies and principles by the
SEC, the courts and Congress would therefore be salutary.
A theory that attempts to protect inside information as
9 Id. at 330-33.
' See CA2 Rejects Challenge to $1.3 Billion Drexel Burnham, Milken Settlement
Pact, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 789 (June 4, 1993).
121 See, e.g., BERGMANS, supra note 5, at 42.
" STEWART, supra note 76, at 72, 73, 76, 96, 97, 132, 143, 151, 152.
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intellectual property, however, is very wide of the mark. The
purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors by man-
dating the continuous disclosure of information by public com-
panies and, in addition, by mandating the disclosure of infor-
mation by bidders in a takeover. The prohibitions against trad-
ing on inside information are a necessary supplement to this
disclosure regime. In allowing issuers and bidders to maintain
confidentiality until information is ripe for disclosure, the secu-
rities laws do not require that all information be publicly dis-
closed on a real-time basis. However, in order to preserve the
fairness, honesty and integrity of the public securities markets,
any failure to disclose material information must be accompa-
nied by an absence of trading informed by such information.
As a practical matter, the law cannot enforce a blanket
parity-of-information rule and capture every tipper and every
tippee. Accordingly, insider trading prohibitions must draw a
line between the legitimate use of informational advantages
and insider trading. It should be recognized, however, that
such line-drawing will necessarily be imperfect and that even a
tipper or tippee who escapes the reach of a principled rule is
engaged in conduct that should not be condoned, and certainly
should not be lauded as contributing to market efficiency.
[Vol. 59: 149
